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Abstract
The economic implications of oil price shocks have been extensively studied since
the oil price shocks of the 1970s’. Despite this huge literature, no dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium model is available that captures two well-known stylized facts: 1)
the stagflationary impact of an oil price shock, together with 2) two possible reactions of
real wages: either a decrease (as in the US) or an increase (as in Japan). We construct
a New-Keynesian dsge model, which takes the case of an oil-importing economy where
oil cannot be stored and where fossil fuels are used in two different ways: One part of
the imported energy is used as an additional input factor next to capital and labor in
the intermediate production of manufactured goods, the remaining part of imported
energy is consumed by households in addition to their consumption of the final good.
Oil prices, capital prices and nominal government spendings are exogenous random
processes. We show that, without capital accumulation, the stagflationary effect is
accounted for in general, and provide conditions under which a rise (resp. a decline)
of real wages follows the oil price shock.
Keywords: New-Keynesian model, dsge, oil, capital accumulation, stagflation.
1 Introduction
The two episodes of low growth, high unemployment, low real wages and high inflation
that characterized most industrialized economies in the mid and late 1970s’ are usually
viewed as the paradigmactic consequences of large price shocks that affect various countries
simultaneously. Despite the huge literature devoted to the implications of oil prices, to the
best of our knowledge, no dynamic general equilibrium model is available that captures
two well-known stylized facts related to this scheme : 1) the stagflationary impact of an
oil price shock, together with 2) two possible reactions of real wages: either a decrease
(as in the US and in most industrialized countries) or an increase (as in Japan, rather the
exception).
On the other hand, the events of the past decade seem to call into question the rele-
vance of oil price changes as a significant source of economic fluctuations. Since the late
1990s’ indeed, the global economy has experienced two oil shocks of sign and magnitude
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comparable to those of the 1970s’ but, in contrast with the latter episodes, GDP growth
and inflation have remained relatively stable in much of the industrialized world (cf. e.g.,
[S0´8], Blanchard and Gali, 2009 [BG08] ; Kilian, 2007 [Kil08]). In [BG08], the suggested
reasons why the effects of oil price shocks have recently weakened are the decrease in real
wage rigidities, smaller oil share in production, and improvements in the credibility of
monetary policy. However, the model used for this purpose exhibits somewhat disturbing
properties that seem at odds with otherwise well-known empirical facts: in particular, as
we show in this paper, the simulation of the dsge model introduced by [BG08] leads to
an increase, not a decrease, of the real GDP after an oil shock —a side-product that was
probably not intended by its authors. As shown by [Hon10], during the 1970s’, Japan is
the unique industrialized country for which such a counterintuitive macroeconomic impulse
response is compatible with a structural VAR analysis. Unfortunately, however, the model
introduced by [Hon10] succeeds in capturing an increase in real GDP after an oil shock but
fails in reproducing the empirically observed increase of Japanese real wages.
This raises the following body of questions. Can we alter the dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (dsge) models considered in the literature so as to account simultaneously for:
- the stagflationary impact of an oil shock ;
- the fall in real wages ;
- conditions under which the Japanese exception occurs (i.e., real wages increase) ;
- the reduction of the sensitivity of industrialized countries to such a shock in the
1990s’?
This paper provides a positive answer to this question. Following Blanchard and Gal´ı
[BG08], we develop a DSGE model by introducing capital accumulation and energy into an
otherwise standard New Keynesian model. The economy is populated by a representative
household, a continuum of intermediate good firms j ∈ [0, 1] who are involved in a mo-
nopolistic competition, a representative final good producing firm without market power,
a government, and a Central Bank. All energy is imported: it is consumed by households
and used as input in the production function of intermediate goods producing firms, along
with labor and capital.
Output is produced with inputs of capital, energy, and labor. Energy is imported from
abroad at an exogenous world price, pE,t, and energy imports are paid for with exports
of output, with trade being balanced at every date. The household works, invests in
government bonds and capital, pays taxes and consumes both energy and the final good.
Each intermediate goods firm uses capital, labor and energy to produce the intermediate
good and sells it to the final good producing firm. The representative final good firm uses
intermediate goods to produce the consumption good and sells it to the household and
to the government. The government finances its public expenditures by raising taxes. A
central bank sets the short-run nominal interest rate according to some Taylor-like rule.
With no capital accumulation and zero public expenditures, our model reduces to the one
first introduced by [BG08] with two changes, in the monetary policy and in the definition
of the GDP deflator.
While the first departure is taken only to facilitate numerical simulations, and is there-
fore anecdotic, the second is not. In [BG08], indeed, the CPI is defined as Pc,t, the core
CPI, as Pq,t and the GDP deflator, as Py,t. The three indices are related by the following
equations:
Pq,t := P
1−αe
y,t P
αe
e,t ; (1)
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Pc,t := P
1−x
q,t P
x
e,t; (2)
and
Py,t := P
β
q,tP
1−β
e,t (3)
where Pe,t/Pq,t is the (exogenous) real price of energy at time t, α, x ∈ (0, 1), but — and
this turns out to be crucial—, β > 1.
These conventions have the paradoxical consequence that, when the energy price ex-
periences an upward shock, then the GDP deflator decreases (everything else being kept
fixed). This turns out to be responsible for the rise of the GDP, Yt, after the shock. Both
phenomena — a decrease of the GDP deflator and an increase of the GDP— are at odds
with empirical evidence from the 1970s”.
[Hon10] succeeds in fixing this issue by identifying the three price indices just alluded
to: Pc,t ≡ Pq,t ≡ Py,t. By doing so, he gets both an increase of the GDP deflator after a
shock, together with an increase of the GDP (which is peculiar to the Japanese economy).
However, this success is impaired by 1) a basic flaw in the model, where it is postulated
that
Yt = Qt, (4)
that is, where the GDP is identified with the output produced by firms, while the house-
hold’s budget constraint implies:
Py,tYt = Py,tQt − PE,tEt. (5)
2) Beyond this inconsistency, as acknowledged by [Hon10], his approach leads to a decrease
of real wages as a response to a price shock, which again contrasts with empirical evidence.
3) [Hon10] leaves open the question of the conditions under which the response to an energy
price shock may be an output decline (resp. growth).
In this paper, we fix these various problems by adopting a price convention similar to
(but weaker than) the one used by [Hon10] —namely, Pc,t = Py,t—, and by keeping (1) and
(2), and (5). This enables us to get an increase of the GDP deflator and real wages after a
shock, together with either an decline or an increase of output. Moreover, we show that the
introduction of capital accumulation does not impair the first 3 stylized facts just recalled.
Quite on the contrary, capital even amplifies the response of the economy to a shock. On
the other hand, in our model, wages are perfectly flexible and the central bank’s monetary
policy is perfectly credible. However, the share of oil in production can be adjusted and
we show that a reduction of this share suffices to imply a significant reduction of the effect
of a shock on macroeconomic performance. This is the way the last fourth phenomenon is
accounted for in this paper.
The next section describes the model. Section 3 provides our main findings.
2 Model
Let us describe carefully how capital accumulation and imported energy enter into the
production process.
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2.1 Household
The representative infinitely-lived household works, invests in government bonds and cap-
ital, pays taxes and consumes both energy and the final good.
The household has an instantaneous utility function
u(Ct, Lt) = log(Ct)− L
1+φ
t
1 + φ
,
where Ct is the consumption at time t, Lt is the labor (e.g. hours worked) and φ is the
inverse of the Frish elasticity.
Labor: at each time, the household is endowed with 1 unit of labor. Let Wt denote
the nominal wage.
Capital: The dynamics of capital accumulation follows
It := Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt,
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the depreciation rate. If, at date t, the household lends Kt+1 units of
capital to the production sector, and if the price of capital is Pk,t+1 at time t + 1, then
the household will receive rkt+1Pk,t+1Kt+1 units of account, where r
k
t+1 is the rental rate of
capital.
Bond: it is the nominal short-run interest rate which is set by the central bank.
Tax: at time t, Tt denotes the tax paid by the household.
Dividend: Being the shareholder of the firms, the household receives the global divi-
dend Dt :=
∫ 1
0 Dt(j)dj, i.e., the sum of dividends of all intermediate good firms.
Given a (perfectly anticipated) sequence of energy prices (Pe,t)t≥0, of intermediate
good i prices (Pq,t(i))t≥0, final good prices (Pq,t)t≥0, nominal wages (Wt)t≥0, taxes (Tt)t≥0,
capital prices (Pk,t)t≥0, capital rental rates (rkt )t≥0 and nominal short-run interest rates
(it)t≥0, the household chooses a consumption and labor plan consisting of a sequence of
final good consumption (Cq,t)t≥0, energy consumption (Ce,t)t≥0, capital lending (Kt)t≥0,
bond lending/borrowing1 on the monetary market (Bt)t≥0, and labor supply (Lt)t≥0 in
order to maximize its discounted utility. Thus, the problem of the household is
max E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
u(Ct, Lt)
]
, 0 < β < 1, (6)
subject to : Pe,tCe,t + Pq,tCq,t + Pk,t(Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt) +Bt
≤ (1 + it−1)Bt−1 +WtLt +Dt + rkt Pk,tKt + Tt,
where the consumption flow is defined as:
Ct := ΘxC
x
e,tC
1−x
q,t , (7)
1Whenever Bt ≥ 0 (resp. ≤ 0), the household is lending (resp. borrowing) money to (resp. from) the
government.
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with x ∈ (0, 1) being the share of oil in consumption, and Θx := x−x(1 − x)−(1−x). We
stress that (7) implies that part of the imported energy will be consumed by the household.
In order to ensure that this programme has a solution, we impose the following transver-
sality condition (no Ponzi scheme):
lim
k→∞
Et
 Bt+kt+k−1∏
s=0
(1 + is−1)
 ≥ 0, ∀t. (8)
Optimal allocation of expenditures among different domestic goods yields:
Pq,tCq,t = (1− x)Pc,tCt (9)
Pe,tCe,t = xPc,tCt (10)
CPI index: Pc,t = P
x
e,tP
1−x
q,t (11)
By solving the first order conditions we have the following inter-temporal optimality con-
ditions:
1 = βEt
[
(1 + it)
Ct
Ct+1
Pc,t
Pc,t+1
]
(12)
1 = βEt
[ Ct
Ct+1
Pc,t
Pc,t+1
Pk,t+1
Pk,t
(rkt+1 + 1− δ)
]
(13)
Wt
Pc,t
= CtL
φ
t (14)
Condition (12) is the standard Euler equation on consumption. Condition (13) is the
familiar Fisher relationship between the capital rate of depreciation, the rental rate of cap-
ital and the subjective discount rate. The stochastic discount factors are defined as follows:
1. Stochastic discount factor from date t to date t+ 1
dt,t+1 :=
βu′C(Ct+1, Lt+1)
u′C(Ct, Lt)
Pc,t
Pc,t+1
, i.e,
1
1 + rt
= Et(dt,t+1).
2. Stochastic discount factor from date t to date t+ k
dt,t+k :=
t+k−1∏
s=t
∆s+1s , then, dt,t+k :=
βku′C(Ct+k, Lt+k)
u′C(Ct, Lt)
Pc,t
Pc,t+k
.
2.2 Final good firm
There is a continuum, [0, 1], of intermediate goods that serve in producing the consumption
commodity. A representative final good producing firm maximizes its profit without market
power. Her CES production function is given by
Qt =
( ∫
[0,1]
Qt(i)
−1
 di
) 
−1
, (15)
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where  > 0 is the elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods. For simplicity, no
energy is needed to produce the final commodity out of the intermediate goods.
Given all the intermediate goods prices (Pq,t(i))i∈[0,1] and the final good price Pq,t, the final
good firm chooses quantities of intermediate goods (Yt(i))i∈0,1 in order to maximize her
profit. Her problem is then
max
Yt(·)
Pq,tYt −
∫
[0,1]
Pq,t(i)Yt(i)di (16)
subject to : Yt =
( ∫
[0,1]
Yt(i)
−1
 di
) 
−1
(17)
Therefore, the demand of good i is given by Yt(i) =
(Pq,t(i)
Pq,t
)−
Yt. The production function
of the final good firm exhibits constant return to scale, so that, at equilibrium, we the zero
profit condition will hold. The price of the final good will therefore be:
Pq,t =
( ∫
[0,1]
Pq,t(i)
1−di
) 1
1−
. (18)
2.3 Intermediate goods firms
Each intermediate commodity is produced through a Cobb-Douglas technology involving
energy:
Qt(i) = AEt(i)
αeLt(i)
α`Kt(i)
αk (19)
αe, α`, αk ≥ 0, αe + α` + αk ≤ 1
The strategy of firm i: Firm i takes prices Pe,t and Wt, and demand Qt(i) as given,
it chooses quantities of energy Et(i), labor Lt(i), and capital Kt(i) in order to minimize
cost. And then it chooses price Pq,t(i) so as to maximize its profit. Regarding the price for-
mation process, two cases will be considered: flexible prices and staggered prices a` la Calvo.
We suppose that F (Et(i), Lt(i),Kt(i)) = AEt(i)
αeLt(i)
α`Kt(i)
αk . The cost minimization
problem of firm i is
minimize cost: Pe,tEt(i) +WtLt(i) + r
k
t Pi,tKt(i) (20)
subject to Et(i), Lt(i),Kt(i) ≥ 0, (21)
F (Et(i), Lt(i),Kt(i)) ≥ Qt(i) (22)
The first order conditions of this problem give
marginal cost = λ(i) :=
Wt
α`
Qt(i)
Lt(i)
=
rkt Pi,t
αk
Qt(i)
Kt(i)
=
Pe,t
αe
Qt(i)
Et(i)
. (23)
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Then we have
cost(Qt(i)) := Pe,tEt(i) +WtLt(i) + r
k
t Pi,tKt(i)
= (αe + α` + αk)λ(i)Qt(i).
Denote Ft :=
( Aααee αα`` ααkk
Pαee,tW
α`
t (r
k
t Pi,t)
αk
) −1
αe+α`+αk , then
cost function: cost(Qt(i)) = (αe + α` + αk)FtQt(i)
1
αe+α`+αk , (24)
marginal cost: mct(i) := λ(i) = FtQt(i)
1
αe+α`+αk
−1
. (25)
2.3.1 Flexible prices
At each date t, firm i’s profit maximization problem is
max
Pq,t(i)
Pq,t(i)Qt(i)− cost(Qt(i)) (26)
subject to Qt(i) =
(Pq,t(i)
Pq,t
)−
Qt.
Note that this problem does not depend on i either. Consequently its solution Pq,t(i)
does not depend on i, i.e. Pq,t(i) = P
∗
q,t for every i. Combining with the fact that
Pq,t :=
( ∫
[0,1]
Pq,t(i)
1−θdi
) 1
1−θ , we have Pq,t(i) = Pq,t for every i.
The first order condition for P ∗q,t gives
P ∗q,t =

− 1mc
∗
t , (27)
where mc∗t := FtQ
1
αe+α`+αk
−1
t .
In order to distinguish the two price formation settings, we denote by Q∗t the output at
date t with flexible prices. Let µp :=

− 1 be the price markup.
2.3.2 Calvo price setting
Assumption 1. (Calvo price setting)
As in Calvo ([Cal83]), we suppose that a fraction, θ, of intermediate good firms cannot
reset their prices at time t:
Pq,t(i) = Pq,t−1(i).
and a fraction 1− θ set their prices optimally:
Pq,t(i) = P
o
q,t(i).
We will prove that all P oq,t(i) do not depend on i, so we can write P
o
q,t(i) = P
o
q,t. for every
i. Assumption 1 gives the following ”Aggregate Price Relationship”
Pq,t =
(
θP 1−q,t−1 + (1− θ)(P oq,t)1−
) 1
1−
. (28)
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At date t, denote Qt,t+k(i) be the output at date t+ k for firm i that last reset its price in
period t. Firm i’s problem is
max
Pq,t(i)
Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
θkdt,t+k
[
Pq,t(i)Qt,t+k(i)− cost(Qt,t+k(i))
]]
(29)
subject to Qt,t+k(i) =
(Pq,t(i)
Pq,t+k
)−
Qt+k, ∀k ≥ 0.
Note that this problem does not depend on i, hence its solution Pq,t(i) does not either, we
write
Pq,t(i) = P
o
q,t.
From the first order condition for P oq,t we have
Et
∞∑
k=0
θkdt,t+kQ
o
t,t+k
[
P oq,t − µpmcot,t+k
]
= 0, (30)
where mcot,t+k := Ft+k(Q
o
t,t+k)
1
αe+α`+αk
−1
, and Qot,t+k =
( P oq,t
Pq,t+k
)−
Qt+k for every k ≥ 0.
Denote
Aot := Et
∞∑
k=0
θkdt,t+kQ
o
t,t+k, (31)
Bot := Et
∞∑
k=0
θkdt,t+kQ
o
t,t+kmc
o
t,t+k. (32)
We have
P oq,tA
o
t = µ
pBot , (33)
Aot := Q
o
t,t + θEtdt,t+1Aot+1, (34)
Bot := Q
o
t,tmc
o
t,t + θEtdt,t+1Bot+1. (35)
2.4 Monetary policy
Let Πq,t :=
Pq,t
Pq,t−1
be the core inflation.
We suppose that the Central Bank sets the nominal short-term interest rate by the following
monetary policy
it =
1
β
ln(Πq,t)
φpi ln
(Py,tYt
P yY
) 1
2
, (36)
where Y and P y represent the steady state of Yt and Py,t. We will define these concepts
further in the paper.
2.5 Government
The Government budget constraint is:
(1 + it−1)Bt−1 +Gt = Bt + Tt, (37)
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where Gt is the nominal government spending which we take as exogenously given by
Gt = func(Gt−1, Pq,tQt, eg,t).
We choose this function to be
ln(Gt) = (1− ρg)(ln(ωP qQ)) + ρg ln(Gt−1) + eg,t
where ω represents the share of output that the government takes for its own spending.
2.6 Equilibrium
At equilibrium,
(i) Each economic agent solves its maximization problem;
(ii) All markets clear, i.e., the following equations hold:
Capital: Kt =
∫
[0,1]
Kt(i)di, (38)
Labor: Lt =
∫
[0,1]
Lt(i)di, (39)
Energy: Et =
∫
[0,1]
Et(i)di, (40)
Resource constraint: Pc,tCt + Pk,tIt +Gt = Pq,tQt − Pe,tEt. (41)
(iii) And the government budget constraint is fulfilled:
(1 + it−1)Bt−1 +Gt = Bt + Tt, (42)
2.7 Dispersion of relative prices
We have (proof is given in Appendix A.6)( ∫
[0,1]
(Pq,t(i)
Pq,t
) −
αe+α`+αk di
)αe+α`+αk
Qt = AE
αe
t L
α`
t K
αk
t . (43)
Define vt :=
∫
[0,1]
(Pq,t(i)
Pq,t
) −
αe+α`+αk di. Then by Calvo setting, we get
vt = θvt−1Π

αe+α`+αk
q,t + (1− θ)
(P oq,t
Pq,t
) −
αe+α`+αk (44)
2.8 GDP and GDP deflator
In Blanchard and Gal´ı [BG08] the following identification is used.
Definition 1. At each date t, the value added (or GDP), Yt, and GDP deflator, Py,t, are
defined implicitly as follows
Pq,t = P
1−αe
y,t P
αe
e,t , (45)
Py,tYt = Pq,tQt − Pe,tEt. (46)
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We adopt this definition of value added but, as we will see in the sensibility analysis, this
definition of GDP deflator, Py,t, is quite fragile. We propose another approach. Empirically
there are not much differences between the CPI index and the GDP deflator, therefore, we
suppose that
Py,t := Pc,t (47)
2.9 Real prices of oil and capital
We define real prices of oil and capital relative to the price of final good
St :=
Pe,t
Pq,t
(48)
Sk,t :=
Pk,t
Pq,t
. (49)
In order to complete our model, we suppose that both the real price of oil and the price of
capital follow AR(1) processes
ln(St) = ρsln(St−1) + eo,t (50)
ln(Sk,t) = ln(Sk,t−1) + ek,t. (51)
3 Simulations and results
We calculate the steady state ourselves and then by using the software Dynare we simulate
it at the second order. This software gives us also the impulse response functions (IRFs)
to the three different shocks included in our model. Using the algorithm of Kim, Kim,
Shaumburg and Sims ([KKSS03]) implemented in Dynare by the command ”pruning” we
have that the model is robust to the size of the shocks, meaning that a bigger shock in
any of the stochatic variables, will not change qualitatively the response of the endogenous
variables of the model.
3.1 Impulse response function analysis
In a first step, we run our model with the standard parameters from the literature. Their
values and sources are shown in Table 1. The time period represents a quarter.
3.1.1 IRF of a shock on the real price of oil
The impulse response functions (IRFs) of each variable is calculated as a percentage devi-
ation from its steady state. As seen in Figure 1 a shock in the real price of oil provokes an
increase in all prices. As expected the nominal price of oil rises much more than the other
prices and the price of capital follows the same pattern as the price of domestic goods. Both
inflation measures increase instantly but quickly recover their original levels. The quantity
of energy used by the intermediate firms decreases and follows a similar pattern, in oppo-
site direction, to the real price of oil. The same effect is observed in the consumption of
energy by the households. This effect comes from the Cobb-Douglas specification assumed
for the production function : the elasticity of substitution between factors of production
is one, therefore the firms can perfectly substitute capital and labor to energy, when faced
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Parameter Value Source
β 0.99 Classic
φ 1 Classic
 6 [BG08]
θ 0.75 [BG08]
δ 0.06 [FBQF12]
ω 0.2 [Sim11]
α` 0.7 [BG08]
αk 0.2
αe 0.015 [BG08]
x 0.023 [BG08]
ρs 0.97 [BG08]
ρsk 0.85
ρeg 0.85 [Sim11]
σsk 0.01
σg 0.01 [Sim11]
var(ln(St)) 0.16
2 [BG08]
σs ((1− ρ2s)var(ln(St)))
1
2 = 0.038 [BG08]
Table 1: Basic Parametrization
with a positive oil price shock. Moreover, saying that the elasticity of production with
respect to energy use is low, firms are further prone to substitute capital and labor to
energy. The same applies to private consumption. In this line, labor demand increases
slightly, which implies higher wages. Capital does not vary instantly, this last effect could
be associated to the fact that the price of capital rises only slightly. However, after the
shock, the capital decreases and this could be because the energy use increases, so the
firms revert the substitution between energy, labor and capital. GDP goes down. Global
consumption goes down, seeing the fall in GDP and the rise in prices. As in the case of
the firms, the elasticity of substitution between domestics goods and energy is one so the
decline in the energy consumption is bigger than the decline in domestic consumption.
3.1.2 IRF of a real price of capital shock
Figure 2 shows the IRFs to a shock on the real price of capital. This kind of shock could
be associated for example to an increase in real estate prices. In this case, at the moment
of the shock, the nominal price of capital increases at the same amount than the real one.
Other prices remain at their steady state values, because the shock in the real price of oil
is zero, and each of them follows the final good price , i.e they progressively increase. Both
inflation measures have the same pattern as the previous case, yet with less accentuated
reactions. The main differences between this shock and the last one, is that capital and
employment react in an opposite way when the shock occurs, both types of private con-
sumption increase in the same amount. The interest rate largely decreases as the rental
rate of capital by a no-arbitrage relation. Also wages fall in contrast with the last shock.
This last effect comes from the fact that the labor decreases.
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3.1.3 IRF of government spending shock
Finally, Figure 3 shows the IRFs to a shock on the government spending. With the for-
mulation of the government expenditure function that we have adopted, a shock on eg of
standard deviation equal to 1% produce an increase 0.8% in the Government spending.
Here, all prices do the same and follow the reaction of the final consumption good price,
falling when the shock occurs, but in any case less than a 0.01%. This shock does not
produce to much inflation either. Energy and capital fall, but energy recovers sharply its
level a few quarters later. Employment rises and so does domestic production also rises,
along with GDP, consistent with higher government spending.
3.2 Sensitivity analysis
3.2.1 Sensitivity to price stickiness
Going back to the shock in the real price of oil, we now change some parameters in order
to study the sensitivity of our model to some changes in elasticities, the stickiness of prices
and the coefficients of the Taylor rule. Let us first make the prices more flexible, we put
θ = 0.5 instead of 0.75. Figure 4 shows the IRFs. If there are more firms that can reset
their prices, then the latter will increase even more, which will produce also an increase in
the price of capital, provoking then a bigger decrease in the quantity of capital, in invest-
ment and in the real return of capital. Pq rises more, hence the production of final goods
will decrease more and then labor too. However, this increase is much muted than before
and then the impact on wages will be slightly negative.
3.2.2 Sensitivity to the definition of GDP deflator
Let us now adopt the definition of the the GDP deflator give by Blanchard and Gal´ı
([BG08]), Py,t = P
1
1−αe
q,t P
−αe
1−αe
e,t . Figure 5 shows the comparison of the endogenous variables
that substantially change using this both definitions. We observe that under the definition
of Blanchard Gal´ı the GDP deflator falls and the value added increases, which oppose with
the empirical data, that shows that in every oil shock, a rise on the CPI index and on the
GDP deflator is observed. Empirically an increase in the GDP could be observed in the
last oil shock of 2000s but in this part we are using the parametrization that approaches
more to the 1970s’ environment, so this increase in GDP is suspicious. That is why we feel
confortable with the definition that we have adopted.
Actually this effect is even verified in the model of Blanchard and Gal´ı where capital does
not exist and Bt = 0 (so Gt = 0). Figure 6 shows the IRFs where the only modification
is on the Taylor Rule, using instead the one defined by Blanchard and Gal´ı, the one we
imply in our model. Theoretically, this effect on the GDP deflator is not surprising, it just
come from its definition Py,t = P
1
1−αe
q,t P
−αe
1−αe
e,t . When St rises, Pe,t rises a lot more than Pq,t
and so Py,t falls. GDP then has rose, because its price responses negatively.
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3.2.3 Sensitivity of the Taylor response to inflation coefficient
Let us now make a change on the coefficient of the Taylor rule φpi, meaning that the central
bank reacts more against the inflation. Figure 7 shows the IRFs in both cases. We observe
that global consumption and final good consumption are a little bit more negative when
the Central Bank fights more agains the inflation. As expected, the price of domestic goods
and its inflation react less when the coefficient is bigger, causing also a reduction on the
other prices in exception to the energy price. The reaction of the energy is the same in
both cases, but when the coefficient is bigger, labor does not increase to much provoking
a decrease in the wages. Capital falls a bit more, the interest rate increases less leading
to a decrease in the rental rate of capital. The decrease in the input use provokes an even
bigger decrease in output and value added, so contrary to what some other papers have
found, a bigger reaction of the Central Bank against the inflation affects somehow worse
these two variables.
3.2.4 Sensitivity to the environment change
Now we change the values of αe and x to 0.012 and 0.017 respectively, in order to evaluate
the decline of the energy shares argued by Blanchard and Gal´ı. Figure 8 shows the IRFs in
both cases. As expected from the definition of the model, a decrease in the parameters αe
and x will produce a decrease in the reactions of the endogenous variables face an oil shock.
3.2.5 Comparison to the model without capital
Finally we make a comparison between three different modelizations of the problem. A
first model which includes energy and labor in the production function, a second which
include energy, capital and labor, where the price of capital is exogenous and equal to Pq
and a third the one of the paper. Figure 9 plot the three models.Here, the inclusion of
capital in the model increases the reaction of the variables to an oil shock.
4 Conclusion
We have developed a DSGE model by incorporating capital accumulation and imported
energy into the standard New-Keynesian framework.
Our first contribution is that the response of the real GDP to an oil shock is very sensi-
tive to the definition of the GDP deflator. Second, the inclusion of the capital accumulation
in the model amplify the negative response of output and GDP due to the persistent effect
of capital accumulation in the dynamic of the model. Third, an increase in the Taylor
response to inflation coefficient amplify the negative impact on output and GDP, moreover
with active monetary policy (φpi = 5 instead of 1.2), the response of real price of oil on
nominal wages turn out to be negative. Fourth, the reduction of oil share in consumption
and in production certainly account for a muted impact on macroeconomic variables face
to a real price of oil shock.
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A Appendix
A.1 First order conditions of households
The Lagrangian associated with the maximization problem of the household has the fol-
lowing from
L0 =
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
[
u(Ct, Lt) + λ
[
Pc,tCt + Pk,tIt
+Bt + Tt + (1 + it−1)Bt−1 +WtLt +Dt + rkt Pk,tKt
]]
Ct : uC(Ct, Lt) = λPc,t (52)
Lt : uL(Ct, Lt) = λWt (53)
Bt : λ = βEt
[
(1 + it)λt+1
]
(54)
Kt+1 : λPk,t = βEt
[
λt+1
(
rkt+1 + 1− δ
)
Pk,t+1
]
. (55)
A.2 First order condition for the Final good Producer
FOC for Yt(i)
Pq,t

− 1
( ∫
[0,1]
Yt(i)
−1
 di
) 
−1−1 − 1

Yt(i)
−1

−1 − Pq,t(i) = 0. (56)
A.3 First order condition for the Intermediate Firms
A.3.1 Cobb-Douglas production function
We suppose
Qt(i) = AEt(i)
αeLt(i)
α`Kt(i)
αk (57)
αe, α`, αk ≥ 0, αe + α` + αk ≤ 1
We have the following Lagrangian for the firms maximization problem
L0 = Pe,tEt(i) +WtLt(i) + rkt Pk,tKt(i)− λ(i)
(
AEt(i)
αeLt(i)
α`Kt(i)
αk −Qt(i)
)
(58)
First-order conditions:
Et(i) : Pe,t = λ(i)αeAEt(i)
αe−1Lt(i)α`Kt(i)αk (59)
Lt(i) : Wt = λ(i)α`AEt(i)
αeLt(i)
α`−1Kt(i)αk (60)
Kt(i) : r
k
t Pk,t = λ(i)αkAEt(i)
αeLt(i)
α`Kt(i)
αk−1. (61)
We define
marginal cost =
d(cost)
d(worker)
d(output)
d(worker)
=
d(cost)
d(capital)
d(output)
d(capital)
=
d(cost)
d(energy)
d(output)
d(energy)
.
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And so equation (23) follows.
On the other hand, we have
Qt(i) = AEt(i)
αeLt(i)
α`Kt(i)
αk
= A
(αeλ(i)Qt(i)
Pe,t
)αe(α`λ(i)Qt(i)
Wt
)α`(αkλ(i)Qt(i)
rkt Pk,t
)αk
=
Aααee α
α`
` α
αk
k
Pαee,tW
α`
t (r
k
t Pk,t)
αk
[
λ(i)Qt(i)
]αe+α`+αk .
If we denote Ft :=
( Aααee αα`` ααkk
Pαee,tW
α`
t (r
k
t Pk,t)
αk
) −1
αe+α`+αk then equations (24) and (25) follows.
A.3.2 Production function: general case
We have the Lagrangian
L0 = Pe,tEt(i) +WtLt(i) + rkt Pk,tKt(i)− λ(i)
(
F (Et(i), Lt(i),Kt(i))−Qt(i)
)
(62)
First-order conditions:
Et(i) : Pe,t = λ(i)FE(Et(i), Lt(i),Kt(i)) (63)
Lt(i) : Wt = λ(i)FL(Et(i), Lt(i),Kt(i)) (64)
Kt(i) : r
k
t Pk,t = λ(i)FK(Et(i), Lt(i),Kt(i)). (65)
We define
marginal cost =
d(cost)
d(worker)
d(output)
d(worker)
=
d(cost)
d(capital)
d(output)
d(capital)
=
d(cost)
d(energy)
d(output)
d(energy)
.
We have
marginal cost = λ(i) =
Wt
FL(Et(i), Lt(i),Kt(i))
(66)
=
rkt Pk,t
FK(Et(i), Lt(i),Kt(i))
=
Pe,t
FE(Et(i), Lt(i),Kt(i))
. (67)
We have
cost(Qt(i)) = Pe,tEt(i) +WtLt(i) + r
k
t Pk,tKt(i)
= λ(i)
(
E(i)FE(Et(i), Lt(i),Kt(i)) + Lt(i)FL(Et(i), Lt(i),Kt(i))
+Kt(i)FK(Et(i), Lt(i),Kt(i))
)
.
Assume that F is constant return to scale, i.e., for every λ > 0, we have
F (λE, λN, λK) = λF (E,N,K).
We obtain
1. F (E,L,K) = EFE(E,L,K) + LFL(E,L,K) +KFK(E,L,K).
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2. Denote xt(i) :=
Et(i)
Lt(i)
, yt(i) :=
Kt(i)
Lt(i)
. FOCs are equivalent to
λ(i)FE(xt(i), 1, yt(i)) = Pe,t (68)
λ(i)FL(xt(i), 1, yt(i)) = Wt (69)
λ(i)FK(xt(i), 1, yt(i)) = r
k
t Pk,t (70)
This system has 3 equations, 3 variables xt(i), yt(i), λ(i). In some crucial condition,
we can compute xt(i), yt(i), λ(i) as functions of Pe,t, Pk,t,Wt, r
k
t , hence λ(i) does not
depend on i.
Therefore, with CES function, we have
cost(Qt(i)) = λ(i)F (Et(i), Lt(i),Kt(i)) = λ(i)Qt(i) = λQt(i).
Then in flexible price, we have (with CES function, and some other conditions)
Pq,t =

− 1λ. (71)
A.4 Calvo Price Setting
Lemma A.1. We have the following ”Aggregate Price Relationship”
Pq,t =
(
θP 1−q,t−1 + (1− θ)(P oq,t)1−
) 1
1−
. (72)
Proof. By definition we have
P 1−q,t =
∫
[0,1]
Pq,t(i)
1−di
=
∫
can not change price
Pq,t(i)
1−di+
∫
set price optimally
Pq,t(i)
1−di
=
∫
[0,1]
θPq,t−1(i)1−di+
∫
[0,1]
(1− θ)Pq,t(i)1−di
= θP 1−q,t−1 + (1− θ)(P oq,t)1−.
FOC for P oq,t:
Et
∞∑
k=0
θkdt,t+kQ
o
t,t+k
[
P oq,t − µpmcot,t+k
]
= 0, (73)
where mcot,t+k := Ft+k(Q
o
t,t+k)
1
αe+α`+αk
−1
, and Qot,t+k =
( P oq,t
Pq,t+k
)−
Qt+k for every k ≥ 0.
Denote
Aot := Et
∞∑
k=0
θkdt,t+kQ
o
t,t+k, (74)
Bot := Et
∞∑
k=0
θkdt,t+kQ
o
t,t+kmc
o
t,t+k. (75)
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We have
P oq,tA
o
t = µ
pBot , (76)
Aot := Q
o
t,t + θEtdt,t+1Aot+1, (77)
Bot := Q
o
t,tmc
o
t,t + θEtdt,t+1Bot+1. (78)
Denote
mot,t+k :=
mcot,t+k
Pq,t+k
.
Then we have
Et
∞∑
k=0
θkdt,t+kQ
o
t,t+k
[
P oq,t − µpmot,t+kPq,t+k
]
= 0, (79)
For each variable, we denote xˆt :=
xt−x
x where x is value of xt at steady state. By log-
linearizing the above equation, we get that
Et
∞∑
k=0
(θβ)k
[
Pˆ oq,t − mˆot,t+k − Pˆq,t+k
]
= 0, (80)
A.5 Dispersion of relative prices
Lemma A.2. We have( ∫
[0,1]
(Pq,t(i)
Pq,t
) −
αe+α`+αk di
)αe+α`+αk
Qt = AE
αe
t L
α`
t K
αk
t . (81)
Proof. We have(Pq,t(i)
Pq,t
)−
Qt = Qt(i) = AEt(i)
αeLt(i)
α`Kt(i)
αk
= AEt(i)
αe
(Pe,tEt(i)
Wt
α`
αe
)α` Pe,tEt(i)
rkt Pk,t
αk
αe
αk
= AEt(i)
αe+α`+αk
(Pe,t
Wt
α`
αe
)α`( Pe,t
rkt Pk,t
αk
αe
)αk
.
Hence we get(Pq,t(i)
Pq,t
) −
αe+α`+αkQ
−
αe+α`+αk
t = Et(i)
[
A
(Pe,t
Wt
α`
αe
)α`( Pe,t
rkt Pk,t
αk
αe
)αk] 1αe+α`+αk .
By taking integral, then take power α; = αe + α` + αk, we have( ∫
[0,1]
(Pq,t(i)
Pq,t
)−
α di
)α
Qt = E
αe+α`+αk
t A
(Pe,t
Wt
α`
αe
)α`( Pe,t
rkt Pk,t
αk
αe
)αk
. (82)
Recall that
WtLt(i)
α`
=
rkt Pk,tKt(i)
αk
=
Pe,tEt(i)
αe
.
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By taking integral, we have
WtLt
α`
=
rkt Pk,tKt
αk
=
Pe,tEt
αe
.
Combining with (82), we obtaint the result.
Define vt :=
∫
[0,1]
(Pq,t(i)
Pq,t
) −
αe+α`+αk di. Then by Calvo setting, we get that
Lemma A.3.
vt = θvt−1Π

αe+α`+αk
q,t + (1− θ)
(P oq,t
Pq,t
) −
αe+α`+αk (83)
Proof. See Lemma A.1
A.6 Simulations
A.6.1 Steady state
Static problem of Household: C = ΘxC
x
eC
1−x
q (84)
Pc = P
x
e P
1−x
q (85)
PqCq = (1− x)PcC (86)
PeCe = xPcC. (87)
1 = β(rk + 1− δ) (88)
Budget constraint: PcC + δPkK = WN + r
kPkK + Π, (89)
Π = PqQ− PeE −WL− rkPkK (90)
FOCs of household: W = PcCL
φ (91)
Production function: Q = AEαeLα`Kαk (92)
FOCs of firms :
PeE
αe
=
WL
α`
=
rkPkK
αk
(93)
PeE =
αe(− 1)

PqQ. (94)
And we assume that
S =
Pe
Pq
,where S is exogenous (95)
Sk =
Pk
Pq
,where Sk is exogenous (96)
Solution: we have to find (C,Ce, Cq, Pc, Pe, Pq, Pk, r
k,W,Q,E,N,K). Without loss of
generality, we can take Pe = 1. By using PcC+δPkK+G = PqQ−PeE, E = αe(− 1)

PqQ,
and
PeE
αE
=
rkPkK
αk
, we have
PcC = PqQ− PeE − δPkK −G
= PqQ
(
1− ω − αe(− 1)

− αe(− 1)

δαk
αerk
)
(97)
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Therefore, we can compute
PqQ
PcC
. The system of equations becomes
Pe = 1, Pc = P
1−x
q , (98)
Pq = 1/S, Pk = PqSk with S, Sk will be chosen (99)
rk =
1
β
− 1 + δ (100)
C =
(
1− ω − αe(− 1)

(1 + δ
αk
αerk
)
)
P xq Q (101)
Cq = (1− x)PcC (102)
Ce = xPcC (103)
W = PcCL
φ (104)
Q = AEαeLα`Kαk (105)
E
αe
=
WL
α`
(106)
E =
αe(− 1)

PqQ (107)
By combining W = PcCL
φ and
E
αe
=
WL
α`
, we can compute L
Lφ+1 =
(− 1)α`

PqQ
PcC
(108)
Q1−αe−αk = ALα`
(− 1

α`Pq
)αe(− 1

αkPq
rkPk
)αk (109)
E =
αe(− 1)

PqQ (110)
W =
α`(− 1)
L
PqQ. (111)
S = Sk = 1, then we can calculate Pq, Pk and so on.
Remark A.1. We have to choose parameters such that there exists a steady state. Not
difficult, but we have to pay attention.
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